In a multilevel security database there are multiple beliefs about a given real world object. The ability of a database model to accommodate multiple beliefs is termed polyinstantiation in the multilevel security literature. In this paper we remark that in an abstract sense polyinstantiation is a priori present in all models for temporal and spatial databases. In particular we investigate the applicability of the parametric model for temporal data to query multilevel security data and, as a case study, compare it to a model for multilevel security given by Winslett, Smith, and Qian. simpler query language than that in the WSQ model. In [GY88,GN93] it has been shown that whereas the query languages in the parametric model handles the natural language constructs "or", "and", and "not" symmetrically, the languages that use tuple timestamps do not achieve this symmetry. The same arguments in [GY88,GN93] would reveal a lack of symmetry in the WSQ model as well as in other models in multilevel security literature.
simpler query language than that in the WSQ model. In [GY88,GN93] it has been shown that whereas the query languages in the parametric model handles the natural language constructs "or", "and", and "not" symmetrically, the languages that use tuple timestamps do not achieve this symmetry. The same arguments in [GY88,GN93] would reveal a lack of symmetry in the WSQ model as well as in other models in multilevel security literature.
Another advantage of the parametric model is that it leads to a seamless integration of ordinary, temporal, spatial, and belief data. This integration in the parametric model would be much tighter than the integration of temporal and multilevel security data in [PM94].
The identities in the parametric model and algebraic optimization has been discussed in [NG92] . That approach to algebraic optimization also applies to the parametric model for multilevel security.
Lastly it must be remembered that the data in the real world has more complex structure than 1nf. If our language seems simpler, it is because it has imitated the "real" structure rather then temper with it to fit the 1nf mold. In fact, the structure of multilevel security data is far more complex than what is covered in this paper in terms of u-polyinstantiation. Key-polyinstantiation represents the true form of polyinstantiation, and this form of polyinstantiation has been covered extensively in our works during the last decade. In particular, key-polyinstantiation in multilevel security has been covered in [CG97a,CG97b].
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Conclusions
This paper has shown a fundamental relationship that exists between the parametric model and multilevel security databases. It has also shown how the parametric model for temporal data readily adapts to multilevel security. In this venture, the only changes in the temporal model are as follows:
• Change of the term instant (of time) to the term user (or user level)
• Change of the term temporal element to user element
• Derivation of user hierarchy in multilevel security as a special case of the user hierarchy in a generic parametric model. 
The above expression is complex because it has to handle the quantifier "for all" (∀) at the relation level. However, note that the English query does not involve quantification at the relational level, but only at the object level. Though relational level quantifications would be complex in the algebra for parametric model, the object level quantification would not. In the algebra of the parametric model it is expressed as follows. metric model, when a user poses a query, the query is executed for the whole database, and if the user wants to restrict the computation to a level u, every operand relation should be restricted to u by the user. On the other hand, in the WSQ model when a user u poses a query, it is evaluated for the data at level u. If the user wants to involve the data at additional levels, it should use "↑ U" explicitly in the query. This difference by itself is not a shortcoming of either of the two models.
The identities for the e↓ φ operator in the parametric model stated above are a direct counterpart of those in the WSQ model. In particular, observe that in the parametric model the identity (e 1 − e 2 ) ↓ µ = (e 1 ↓ µ) − (e 2 ↓ µ) holds. Thus the difference operator in the parametric model is well behaved. We note that the e↓ φ operator in the parametric model works cleanly in every conceivable context. Consider the following remarks about the level shift operator e ↑ U in the WSQ model.
• It is stated in [WSQ94] that because of the unary nature of relation U in the level shift operator e ↑ U, U cannot be involved in a projection, a selection or a cartesian product. In the parametric model these possibilities do not arise because the domain expressions are not relations, they are simply time domains. In addition, the syntax they lead to is simple, powerful, and uniform.
• It is stated in [WSQ94] that U cannot involve the difference operator. In the parametric model no such problem arises: e ↓ (µ 1 − µ 2 ) is allowed, and the natural identity e ↓ (µ 1 − µ 2 ) = e ↓ µ 1 − e ↓ µ 2 holds.
• It is also stated in [WSQ94] that a cascade of level shift operators does not give rise to interesting identities in general. This is not a problem in the parametric model, where the natural identity (e ↓ µ 1 ) ↓ µ 2 = e ↓ (µ 1 ∩ µ 2 ) holds.
Querying the multilevel security data
In the following we exhaustively cover all queries from [WSQ94]
1 . Let's compare how these queries are expressed in the WSQ and the parametric models. We find that the parametric model, where the queries are usually simpler than those in the WSQ model has a distinct advantage. Recall that the constant me stands for the user who submits a query. We will now use the variable Users to denote the space of all user levels.
Example 9. List my belief about John's department. For this query, the expressions in the algebras of the WSQ and parametric models are given below. The expressions illustrate the difference in the defaults used in the two models. In the WSQ model the query is executed only on the data at the level where the query is submitted. On the other hand in the parametric model it would be executed on the whole database, necessitating explicit restriction to me.
Parametric model: Π Dept σ (emp, Name = John, me)
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The results of a level shift operator can be unexpected. As evidence, we observe that (e 1 −e 2 ) ↑µ can be a proper superset of (e 1 ↑µ) − (e 2 ↑µ). This is shown in the following counter example. In contrast, in the parametric model the relational difference operator will always behave as expected. The reason for this is that in the parametric model the user level can never be separated from a value; thus, the distinction between a value such as 55K at two different user levels is not ignored by the system.
The restriction operator in the parametric model
Now it is time to introduce an operator that comes closest to the level shift operator of WSQ. Recall the 1-3-selection, σ (e, , φ), for the parametric model for multilevel security. Here φ is a domain expressions, and as explained above φ is very versatile: it consists of subqueries that are relational, domain, and boolean expressions. We will use the abbreviation e↓ φ for σ (e, , φ). 2 The operator e↓ φ is called the restriction operator. The following identities could be proved for the restriction operator:
• σ (e, φ) ↓ µ = σ (e ↓ µ, φ)
• (e 1 ∪ e 2 ) ↓ µ = (e 1 ↓ µ) ∪ (e 2 ↓ µ)
• (e 1 − e 2 ) ↓ µ = (e 1 ↓ µ) − (e 2 ↓ µ)
It is appropriate to think of e↓ φ in the parametric model as the counterpart of the level shift operator e ↑ U. The reader should be cautioned that the two operators are duals of each other because of the way defaults work in the two models. In the para-1. Strictly speaking {a,b} should be written as {〈a〉,〈b〉}.
2. In [Ga88] e↓ φ was written as eφ. Note the use of the down arrow in e ↓ φ, as opposed to the up arrow in the level shift operator e ↑ U. The arrow direction seem appropriate: the restriction operator e ↓ φ removes information from e, whereas the level shift operator e ↑ U adds information to e.
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• The above query disregards the source levels in the final result. If this information is desired, instead of the query "emp↑ anyone", one can pose the query "(emp×self)↑ anyone", which gives rise to the relation shown in Figure 8 (b) . Note that the information contained in this relation is the same as that in the relation of Figure 1 (b) , which is the counterpart of a temporal relation with tuple label stamping. • As seen above, there are two types of operators in the WSQ model: the classical operators and the level shift operator. The classical operators obviously satisfy the classical identities. For the level shift operator, [WSQ94] lists several identities; the following is a sampling: 1
• σ (e, φ) ↑ µ = σ (e ↑ µ, φ)
• (e 1 ∪ e 2 ) ↑ µ = (e 1 ↑ µ) ∪ (e 2 ↑ µ)
• (e 1 − e 2 ) ↑ µ ⊇ (e 1 ↑ µ) − (e 2 ↑ µ) In the WSQ model there is a lack of uniformity between the stored and computed relations. For a given database scheme, there is an instance of that database scheme at each user level in the stored database. On the other hand, the computed relations are not placed anywhere in the user hierarchy. Even if the relation computed by e↑ U was placed at the level of the user posing the query, a corresponding instance would not exist at other levels. This tends to make the level shift operator a terminal operator: that is, once it is applied, it cannot be applied again. It is difficult to use a computed relation and a stored relation as subqueries in a larger query. In contrast, in the parametric model the relational scheme is the same as the one in classical databases, and for each relation scheme in the database scheme there is only one relation in the database. No expression in the parametric model is terminal in the sense that it can be used as a subquery of a larger query.
Discussion
Page 12 the other hand in the WSQ model when a user u poses a query to the system, the system executes the query only on the instance of the database available to user u. Thus a user can perform classical operators on the relations owned by him/her.
The level shift operator
In addition to the classical operators, the WSQ model introduces an operator, called the level shift operator. To ease the formalism associated with the level shift operator, let's first introduce a notation: if e is a relational expression, and u is a user level, then e↑ u denotes the relation computed by the expression e with the data available only at level u. The level shift operator is of the form e↑ U, where e is any relational expression and U is a single column relational expression containing tuples that are user levels. 1 e↑ U = ∪ 〈u〉 ∈ U (e↑ u) First e is evaluated at every level in U, and then the relations thus obtained are unioned together.
Example 7. Let's consider a few examples to illustrate the use of the self and anyone relations and the level shift operator B. In all these examples let's assume that the queries are being posed by the user u 3 .
• The query "emp" returns the state of the emp relation at user level u 3 .
• The query "emp↑ {〈u 2 〉}" returns the state of the emp relation at user level u 2 .
• The query "emp↑ anyone" is more interesting. To understand it, note that anyone at level u 3 is the relation {〈u 3 〉, 〈u 2 〉, 〈u 1 〉}. Therefore, the query computes the (ordinary) union (emp↑ u 3 ) ∪ (emp↑ u 2 ) ∪ (emp↑ u 1 ). For the given state of the database, this computation leads to the relation shown in Figure 8 (a).
1. To be exact, U is a relational expression which should evaluate to a single column relation containing tuples that are user levels. Page 11
The WSQ model for multilevel security 1
In the WSQ model, a universe {u 1 , u 2 , ⋅⋅⋅, u n } of users together with ≤ is postulated. For a given database scheme, each user in the hierarchy has his/her own level's instance of the database. In addition, each user also owns two relations: "self" and "anyone", each a single column relation over an attribute called "Label". The self relation for user u consists of the single tuple 〈u〉. On the other hand, the anyone relation contains a tuple for the user u and each user below u.
Example 6. Recall that in the running example, the database scheme consists of a single relational scheme emp with attributes Name Salary Dept. We have also postulated the universe {u 1 ,u 2 ,u 3 } of users, where u 1 ≤ u 2 and u 2 ≤ u 3 . As shown in Figure 5 , in the parametric model there is a single relation for all users, and every user has access to a portion of that relation. Figure 7 shows the multilevel security database in the WSQ model that corresponds to the running example. The database in the WSQ model contains nine relations the our running example.
•
Classical relational operators
In the parametric model, when a user u poses a query, the system filters the emp relation to Dom(u), the domain visible to u. Thus by default the system is set to query information belonging to u as well as information belonging to users lower than u. On 1. For ease of reading, we make the following notational changes in syntax: the projection e[X] will be denoted as Π X (e), the selection e[φ] will be denoted as σ(e, φ), and the level shift operator B[e 2 ]e 1 (explained later in this section) will be denoted as e 1↑ e 2 . Page 10 user domains. In such a case, the user u is enrolled at an existing user level and no new user level is created. The alternative would be to choose Dom(u) as a union of some of the existing user domains. This is simply a way of saying that the new user is enrolled at a level that is immediately above the users whose domains have been unioned. One more condition should be added to complete the requirements for the case of multilevel security: Dom(u) must contain the level assigned to u, allowing a user to access his/her own data.
In summary, whereas in a temporal database one has the freedom to enroll any number of users assigning them arbitrary domains, the corresponding assignment of user domains in multilevel security is more constrained. The fundamental requirement is that a user in multilevel security should be able to see his/her own updates made to the database. In this sense, multilevel security is a special case of the temporal case, and not the other way around.
An interesting feature of the parametric approach is that Dom(u) can be integrated in the algebra as a primitive for domain expressions to the set of existing primitives From now onward the terms user and user level will be interchangeably, and no confusion should arise. A few additional primitives useful for querying the parametric model for multilevel security will be added.
• me. When a user u poses a query, the system interprets "me" as u.
• Below (u′). When a user u poses a query, Below (u) is interpreted as Dom(u′) − {u′}.
• Above (u′). When a user u poses a query, and u′ is visible to u, then Above (u′) is interpreted as Dom(u′) − {u′}.
In order to present a simple but intuitive example, assume that the relational algebra contains a relational expression of the form "r", where r is a relation in the stored database.
Example 5. To adapt the running example to multilevel security, we assume the set of users {u 1 , u 2 , u 3 } such that u 1 ≤ u 2 and u 2 ≤ u 3 . Suppose the user u 2 wants to see the current state of the emp relation. To do this he/she executes the query "emp". The query retrieves the result shown in Figure 6. • information at least 10 years old, the analyzer has the last 5 years worth of information, and the classical user only sees the current information (as would be the case in a classical database).
Parametric model for multilevel security
The parametric model for temporal data discussed in the previous sections can easily be adapted to multilevel security. The terms instant and temporal element are changed to user level and user element, respectively. Corresponding to the universe of time {t 1 , t 2 , ⋅⋅⋅, t n } in the temporal case is the universe of user levels {u 1 , u 2 , ⋅⋅⋅, u n } in multilevel security. The relation of Figure 1 (a) in the parametric model for multilevel security will be as shown in Figure 5 .
Note that in the parametric model for temporal data we did not impose any order properties on the instants. Clearly, the parametric model and its query language do not depend upon the order properties. In other words, if an order is imposed on the instants, it does not change the underlying model. The parametric model is generic, that is, it mainly depends upon the set theoretic primitive ⊆ on parametric elements (temporal elements and user elements).
The user hierarchy in multilevel security
The primitive ⊆ on parametric elements leads to a user hierarchy introduced in the previous section. The user hierarchy gives different users access to different portions of the database. In the parametric model a users u 1 is below u 2 in the user hierarchy if and only if Dom(u 1 ) ⊆ Dom(u 2 ), where Dom(u 1 ) and Dom(u 2 ) are the domains assigned by the system to the users u 1 and u 2 .
In multilevel security one encounters a special (less general) case of the user hierarchy. The difference is that in multilevel security, the domains are more rigidly determined by the system. A partial order ≤ among the user levels is postulated and Dom(u) is defined as {u′: u′ ≤ u}. The following property holds in the user hierarchy: Proposition 1. If u 1 and u 2 are user levels, then u 1 ≤ u 2 if and only if Dom(u 1 ) ⊆ Dom(u 2 ).
Note that the primitive Dom(⋅) of parametric databases can be used to induce a partial order ≤ in a multilevel security. To understand this, suppose we choose to use Dom(⋅) as the primitive. When a new user u enrolls to use the database, the Dom(u) must be determined for that user. One choice is to let Dom(u) be one of the existing A precise semantics of this form of select statement can be given easily in the parametric model in terms of selection and projection operators: Π X σ (r, f, φ). As in the definition of the selection operator, the "restricted to" clause limits the retrieval of a tuple τ to the temporal element computed by φ(t). Several examples of the select statement will follow later in the paper.
Concept of user hierarchy in the parametric model
In the previous section, we implicitly assumed that there is only one user for the parametric model. Such a user has access to the whole history, i.e., values in the database during the entire time {t 1 ,t 2 ,⋅⋅⋅,t n }. To facilitate a clear comparison with the WSQ model, we must introduce the concept of a user hierarchy in the parametric model. For the parametric model let's now hypothesize multiple users. Corresponding to every user u, we formally associate a temporal element in {t 1 ,t 2 ,⋅⋅⋅,t n }, called the domain of u, denoted as Dom (u). When a user u submits a query to a database, the system automatically restricts the database to Dom(u) before processing the query. Clearly, the set theoretic containment among users creates a partial order among users. Formally, we say that users u 1 is below u 2 in the user hierarchy if and only if Dom(u 1 ) ⊆ Dom(u 2 ). A user hierarchy is shown in Figure 4 .
The concept of user hierarchy was introduced in [GB89]. There a useful and elaborate hierarchy has been given in a bitemporal model. The following covers an interesting example of users of the temporal model presented in the previous section. specify its snapshots and its key. In the following we assume that the key of r is K, and the natural join is denoted as ◊.
Operator
Definition of Snapshot Designation of Key Stored relation r r(t) Same as key of r Union (e 1 ∪ e 2 ) (t) = e 1 (t) ∪ e 2 (t) Same as key of r and s Difference (e 1 − e 2 ) (t) = e 1 (t) − e 2 (t) Same as key of r and s Natural join (e 1 ◊ e 2 ) (t) = e 1 (t) ◊ e 2 (t) Union of keys of r and s Projection (Π X (e)) (t) = Π X (e)(t) If K ⊆ X then K, else X 1-3-selection (σ (e, ,φ)) (t) = σ (e(t), ,φ(t)) Same as key of r, explained below
The definitions of union, difference, natural join (◊), projection and 1-3-selection 1 given above are completely precise. 2 As an example consider the definition of union. (e 1 ∪ e 2 ) (t) = e 1 (t) ∪ e 2 (t), which shows how snapshots can be computed. A snapshot of the union (e 1 ∪ e 2 ) (t) is defined as e 1 (t) ∪ e 2 (t). The latter is well defined as it is essentially a union of two classical relations. Thus, we have completely specified the snapshots as well as the key of e 1 ∪ e 2 . Therefore, e 1 ∪ e 2 is well defined.
The 1-3-selection σ (e, , φ) needs more explanation. A 1-3-selection is a special case of selection of the form σ (r, f, φ), to be discussed below. In a 1-3-selection the second argument is left blank, and it is the operator in the temporal database that is a direct counterpart of the classical databases. In the 1-3-selection σ (e, , φ), the parameter φ is a domain expression. An example of the 1-3-selection is σ (emp, ,
. In temporal databases, it is a counterpart of the classical selection σ(emp, Dept = Toys ∨ Dept = Shoes).
The general form of a selection is σ (r, f, φ). It evaluates to {τ↓φ(τ): τ∈r, f (τ) and τ↓φ(τ) is not empty}. If f evaluates to TRUE for a tuple, σ allows us to select only a relevant part of it, which is specified by φ. The key of σ (r, f, φ) is the same as the key of r.
3
Example 3. The query give information about employees while they were in Toys or Shoes if they are currently employed can be expressed as follows:
The parametric model also includes an operator that allows a user to change the key of a relation [Ga88] . This operator has very interesting interaction with the selection operator [GN93] . In this paper we will also use an SQL-like select statement for our model. It turns out that for a comparison with the WSQ model, only a simple form of the select statement where the from list consists of a single relation will be needed. In other words, the select statement to be used in this paper is of the form given below: 
Boolean expressions
Boolean expressions are syntactic counterparts of boolean values TRUE and FALSE. They are formed using µ ⊆ ν, where µ and ν are domain expressions. More complex expressions are formed using ∧, ∨, and ¬. Note that expressions of the form µ = ν, µ ≠ ν, etc., can be derived using the above constructs. If t is an instant of time, {t} ⊆ ν can be written as t ∈ ν.
Parametric syntactic forms [[AθB]] and AθB
We have already introduced the syntactic form • The counterpart of the classical syntactic form AθB in the parametric model is the parametric syntactic form [[AθB]] and not the syntactic form AθB.
• One of the uses of the parametric syntactic form AθB is to identify objects. For example, "Name = John" is TRUE only for the first tuple in Figure 3 .
• In a snapshot at an instant t, the distinction between the parametric syntactic forms [[AθB]] and AθB essentially disappears. This is formalized in [BG93] . Therefore, the syntax in the parametric model is a consistent extension of that in the classical model.
Relational expressions
Before introducing relational operators, the concept of weak equality among relations must be defined. Suppose r and s are relations over the same scheme. Then r and s are said to be weakly equal if r and s have the same snapshots, i.e., r(t) = s(t) for all instants t. It is easy to show that if two weakly equal relations have the same key, then the relations are equal. In other words, to specify a relation uniquely it is enough to key attributes. Sometimes, the key attributes will be underlined for emphasis. Figure  2 shows a database with a relation emp(Name Salary Dept) with Name as its key. The relation is a counterpart of the temporal relation of Figure 1 Clearly, the domain of a relation is a temporal element. The restriction of r to temporal element µ, denoted r↓µ, is defined in a natural manner. The snapshot of r at an instant t, denoted r(t), is defined to be r↓ {t}. [[emp] ], the domain of the emp relation of Figure 2 , is {t 1 ,t 2 }. The snapshot of the emp relation at instant t 2 is shown in Figure 3 . The timestamp is not shown in this figure. Because of the homogeneity assumption, the snapshot of a temporal relation is isomorphic to a classical relation without nulls. In the parametric model, a database can be viewed as a parametrization of classical relations. Note that neither [WSQ94] nor this paper considers nulls.
1 Now let's present an algebra for the homogeneous relations. Our algebra includes three types of expressions: domain expressions, which evaluate to temporal elements; boolean expressions, which evaluate to boolean values (TRUE or FALSE); and relational expressions, which evaluate to relations. These three types of expressions are mutually recursive.
Domain expressions
Domain expressions are the syntactic counterparts of temporal elements. They are 1. [WSQ94] states: "Note that our formal treatment does not allow null values, just as ordinary relational algebra omits consideration of nulls. Null values may be included in a formal treatment by formalizing them in one of the many standard manners ..." The same remarks apply to the parametric model where the homogeneity assumption yields the counterpart of classical relations without nulls. Page 2
• On the day that the user at the upper level wants to leak the bit "0", he/she does nothing. On the day the user at the upper level wants to leak the bit "1", he/she inserts a fictitious record for John in the morning and deletes the record in the evening.
• Every afternoon, the user at the lower level tries to insert a (fictitious) record for John. On some days the insertion will go through, and on other days the system will reject the insertion as a violation of the key. If the insertion is confirmed by the system, the user at the lower level assumes that the bit "1" has been sent to him/her by the user at the upper level and the lower-level user deletes the record just inserted. If the system rejects the insertion, the user at the lower level assumes that the bit "0" has been sent by the user at the upper level.
• Typically, in multilevel security literature the covert channel is avoided by adding a "User-level" column to a relation so that the key is not just the Name attribute, but rather "Name and User-level" attributes put together. (See Figure 1(b) .) With this arrangement, the system does not give an error message about duplication of a record. For this solution, the term polyinstantiation has been coined: polyinstantiation means the ability of a system to accommodate multiple beliefs about a real world object in the database. It turns out that there are two levels of polyinstantiation. 
